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IMPROPER APPROPRIATION
by Daniel Gervais*
The traditional test for copyright infringement is satisfied when the owner of
a valid copyright establishes, first, that her work was actually copied and sec-
ond, that the copying amounts to an improper or unlawfid appropriation. As
applied by courts, the second prong of the test is often applied quantitatively
that is, when the amount of the copyrighted work that is copied is more than
de minimis. This seems odd for a test expressed using a term wrought with
moral overtones (impropriety). This Article discusses whether this test could be
applied differently by requiring an examination of the (im)propriety of the
defendant' appropriation.
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INTRODUCTION
The traditional Arnstein test for copyright infringement is satisfied when the
owner of a valid copyright establishes unauthorized copying by the defendant.' To
demonstrate unauthorized copying, one of the major tests is that the plaintiff must
first "show that [her] work was actually copied"; second, she must establish "sub-
stantial similarity" or that "the copying amounts to an improper or unlawful appro-
priation."2 The second prong is satisfied when (i) protected expression in the earlier
work was copied and (ii) the "amount of the copyrighted work that is copied ...
must be more than 'de minimis." 3 Facially-and, as this Article will attempt to
demonstrate, in more substantive ways as well-it seems odd that a test expressed
using a term wrought with moral overtones (impropriety) is essentially applied as a
quantitative test. One could apply this test differently and use it to lay a key norma-
tive pillar of copyright infringement requiring an examination of the (im)propriety
of the defendant's appropriation.
This Article examines, first, how impropriety has been applied in copyright
infringement cases, and, second, whether the test could (doctrinally) and should
(normatively) perform additional work as we move ever more into an era of massive
creative reuse of existing works, whether as appropriation art, user-generated con-
tent or otherwise. The Article suggests that the notion of propriety should play an
enhanced role, especially in cases of reuse of pre-existing copyrighted works.
I. CURRENT ROLE OF PROPRIETY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Propriety in Early Copyright Law
Any analysis of impropriety and its positive antipode, propriety, requires ut-
most semantic caution because historically, "propriety" was a term used at times to
mean what we would today refer to as property.4 In that sense, it is connected to
. PhD, MAE. Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law, Vanderbilt University. Associate
Reporter, Restatement (First) of Copyright. President (2017-2019), International Association for
the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP). Thanks to
Professors Joe Fishman, Tom~is G6mez-Arostegui, Lydia Loren, Chris Sprigman, Zahr Said, and
Molly Van Houweling for their most useful comments on the first draft. All opinions, errors, and
omissions are mine.
i Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (establishing the Arnstein test). See also
Douglas Y'Barbo, The Origins of the Contemporary Standard for Copyright Infringement, 6 INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 285 (1999).
2 Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp. Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir.1998)
(emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc.,
964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cit. 1992).
3 Id. at 138.
4 Proprietary, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). See also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND
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Aquinas' use of proprietas for any form of individual and exclusive possession.5 In
any discussion of the role of "propriety" in early copyright history, therefore, one
must navigate around semantic shoals and distinguish it, where appropriate, from
its use in more modern jurisprudence. As Professor Patterson noted, some early Brit-
ish printing ordinances, including the one issued in 1643, referred to "propriety of
Copies" of books, for example.6 We see this meaning of "propriety" as "property"
in words such as "proprietor" and "proprietary."' In more modern contexts, the
term has taken on a different hue.
B. Propriety in Current US Copyright Law
1. Gauging (Im)propriety in Copyright Law
The Arnstein test speaks of improper or un/awful appropriation. Does "proper"
mean the same thing as "legal"? In other words, is "improper" a synonym of "ille-
gal"? The best answer is negative:
Justice Brennan implicitly recognized in his dissent in Harper & Row, if one
defines propriety in terms of legality, the factor is circular. If 'good faith and
fair dealing' mean engaging only in activities not violative of the Copyright
Act, then it is impossible to decide whether a given activity violates the Act
by considering its propriety. 9
Without positive law to provide a definition efforts to gauge propriety require
using metes and bounds from other sources. These can be found in custom andprac-
tice, and ethics.
Let us begin with custom and practice. In Harper & Row, Justice Brennan re-
ferred to "standard journalistic practice" in his attempt to determine the propriety
of the defendant's conduct.' 0 Indeed, "in the majority of fair use cases, courts could
OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 32 (1993); Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete
Historiographies: OfPiracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1011-12
(2006).
5 See JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 65
(1980).
6 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 129 (1968).
7 Authors sometimes play on this, for example when discussing the propriety of a proprietary
standard. See, e.g. Tom W. Bell, Copyright Porn Trolls, Wasting Taxi Medallions, and the Propriety
of "Property," 18 CHAPMAN L. REV. 799 (2015); MarkA. Lemley & David McGowan, CouldJava
Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 715
(1998).
8 SeeArnstein 154 F.2d at 468.
9 William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1679-80 (1988).
0 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 593 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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not rely upon industry practice to make sense of and justify the 'propriety and cus-
tom' factor."" Custom and practice, as Professor Fisher rightly suggests, is a partic-
ularly useful factor when parties to the case belong to the same epistemic commu-
nity. 12 This link between custom and practice, on the one hand, and propriety, on
the other hand, has a long track record. Adam Smith defined propriety (and impro-
priety) in relational terms involving an agent (whose behavior is being "judged"),
the recipient of the action and a third party (spectator).'
The role of custom and practice in law is quite common. It is sometimes re-
flected in the notion of "customary practice," which refers to widespread behavior
(or behavior perceived as such by a defendant), that may in some cases amount to a
social norm.1 4 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts equates customary practice
and usage and notes that an agreement can be supplemented "if each party knows
or has reason to know of the usage and neither party knows or has reason to know
that the other party has an intention inconsistent with the usage."" Trade usages
"having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade" acquire norma-
tive force and justify "an expectation that [they] will be observed with respect to a
particular agreement."' Custom and practice also plays a central role in tort cases.17
Because the Arnstein test refers to propriety, which can be gauged based on
relevant practices, it seems fair to suggest that, in copyright infringement cases, the
practices of users and especially creative reusers in a given field could and should be
considered. How custom and practice could play a greater role in copyright infringe-
ment analyses may be illustrated by cases situated at the border between breach of
contract and copyright law. For example, in a case dealing with copyright in archi-
tectural drawings, the Ninth Circuit decided that the architect plaintiffs "right to
recover ultimately turns on the custom and usage of the architectural profession."18
Fisher, supra note 9, at 1681.
12 Id. at 1682.
13 See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 19 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie
eds., 1982).
14 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 911 (1996)
(noting that "individual actors acting together can produce the relevant shifts."). See also Daniel
J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards A Liability Regime for File-Sharing, 12 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 39 (2004) (discussing music "file-sharing" and its compatibility with social norms);
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation ofNorms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338,
355 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law:An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON.
REV. 365 (1997).
1 UCC § 1-303 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 221 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
17 See WILIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 132-33 (1987).
1 May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir.1980).
[Vol. 23:2602
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The plaintiff argued what amounted to an implied term in the contract between the
parties, which required due consideration, leading the court to reverse summary
judgment of the defendant.19 It seems reasonable to posit that, if licensing practices
can be scrutinized (the existence of a license, express or implied, being a defense to
copyright infringement), then the absence of a license due to applicable custom and
practice could be considered as well. 20 As the Supreme Court discussed in Harper &
Row, a court could find that an implied license (e.g., to reuse material posted online
under certain circumstances) existed, thus avoiding a fair use analysis.2 ' In the same
way, a court could decide whether applicable custom and practice make an appro-
priation proper, or, in other words, permissible. Looking for propriety in relevant
custom and practice strikes this author as normatively more straightforward than
trying to discern the existence of an implied license.
There is an important caveat that applies to the use of custom and practice to
situate behavioral guideposts. In some circles, such as book publishing, there is a
practice of licensing short excerpts that may well be fair uses. Publishers, by licensing
short quotes to one another, limit the work done by fair use, which, over time, may
restrict the scope of the doctrine. 22 Custom and practice developed by only a discrete
part or subset of the relevant community (which in this case would also include
authors (including the use of quotations) and librarians) are thus suspect. Hence,
this Article agrees with Rothman's suggestion that "a custom should generally only
be applied against parties who participated in its development or, at least, who were
adequately represented in its development." 23
Turning to the role of ethics in copyright law, Justice O'Connor "seemed to
assume that popular morality can and should be the yardstick." 24 A court could avoid
the pitfalls of "deriving substantive standards from 'society's widely shared values' .
11 Id. at 1368.
20 See Dylan J. Quinn, Associated Press v. Meltwater: Are Courts Being Fair to News
Aggregators?, 15 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 1189, 1190-91 (2014) (discussing Associated Press v.
Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) and noting that "an
expanded implied license doctrine in the context of online news media presents an intriguing
alternative to traditional copyright law.").
21 This is tricky of course, as it reduces the work done by the fair use doctrine, but possibly
also its scope of application. See Jennifer Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual
Property, 93 VA. L. REv. 1899, 1943-44 (2007) ("Many courts have picked up the implied
consent analysis from Harper er Row. There are two significant problems, however, with the
Court's suggested approach. First, fair use ceases to make any sense if it turns on whether an author
would consent to the use, since the guiding principle of fair use is to allow uses when there is no
consent, implied or otherwise.").
22 Id at 1911-16.
23 Id. at 1908.
24 Fisher, supra note 9, at 1681 (emphasis added).
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. . in a culture as fractured as that of the United States today." 25 To do so, it could
refer to a moral standard to identify "a theory that would enable it to distinguish
good behavior from bad." 26 The idea that ethical behavior can be derived from
"popular" or community behavior indicates that, in this context at least, "ethics" is
likely a close cousin of custom and practice.27
What is perhaps most striking in comparing the copyright cases about issues
not related to improper appropriation, mentioned in the next section (I.B.2.), and
those on improper appropriation, discussed in the following section (I.B.3.), is the
normative quality with which propriety is infused in the former, but not the latter,
group of cases. In large part, this is probably because, in the latter group of cases,
the impropriety of the defendant's appropriation is an inquiry framed as factual and
performed without expert evidence as to norms or permissibility (if any) that is ap-
plicable to the defendant's conduct.2 8 This framing is not an insurmountable obsta-
cle, however. After all, fact-finders often make factual determinations interwoven
with normative strands, such as whether conduct is "reasonable" or not in medical
malpractice cases, or when juries decide deeply moral questions, such as whether
criminal conduct is sufficiently "cruel" to warrant a harsher penalty.
29 In the version
of the improper appropriation test proposed in Part II of this Article, a determina-
tion of whether the defendant's conduct was proper, that is, whether the copying
25 Id.
6 Id. at 1682. In his article, Professor Fisher discusses several options in that regard. See id.
at 1744-94 (Part V: Utopian Analysis).
27 A determination of relevant customs, practices and applicable ethical norms may require
expert evidence. For an example of expert evidence used to determine the scope and relevance of
a trade usage, see Commercial Union Ins. v. Seven Provinces Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 2d 49, 66, affd,
217 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2000). Expert evidence is routinely used, for example, concerning usage in
determining "usefulness of the article and whether any apparent functional aspects can be
separated from the artistic aspects." Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984).
See alo Norris Indus. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983); Trans-World
Manufacturing v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 95, 97 (D. Del.1982). This change alone
(allowing expert evidence at this stage of the inquiry) could transform the role that propriety plays
in infringement analyses.
28 See Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp. Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137-38 (2d
Cir.1998); infra note 45 and accompanying text.
29 This cuts both ways, as juries may soften a law's harsh application or adopt a harsher
stance than might otherwise seem warranted. See Kristen K. Sauer, Informed Conviction:
Instructing the Jury About Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1256
(1995) ("Historically, juries have exercised their nullification power as a political check on the
imposition of both harsh punishments and harsh laws."). On determinations of reasonable
medical behavior, by juries, see Neil Vidmar, AreJuries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases
Involving Scientific/Medical Issues: Some Data From Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 906-
07 (1994) ("Anecdotes about the widespread malperformance of juries do not stand up to
systematic data . . . ." which "indicate that juries are not systematically biased against doctors and
that in the preponderance of cases they make reasonable decisions.").
[Vol. 23:2604
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was permissible, would amount to this type of "normative-factual" determination.
2. Application to Cases Other Than Improper Appropriation
The term "propriety" is often used by U.S. courts in copyright cases to perform
work not related to improper appropriation determinations. This is hardly surpris-
ing. Propriety, and its adjectival form "proper," are terms that, like fairness/fair, can
inform a court's analysis and serve as a convenient vehicle to carry an equitable de-
termination to its outcome in a court's decision. For example, propriety played a
role in situating the border between protected expression and unprotected idea. Pro-
fessor Golvan, in discussing the 1935 case of Echevarria v. Warner Bros Pictures,
opined that "an unfair commercial advantage may be obtained through the use of
the detail of a story without the originator of the story receiving some reward," in
an analysis focused on "commercial propriety."3 0 In Perfectl10 v. Google, the Ninth
Circuit applied propriety as a general principle in evaluating injunctive relief (in
copyright cases). 3 Propriety has also been a crucial factor in determining whether a
court should exercise jurisdiction over foreign infringement.32
Propriety has also played a key role in helping courts in fair use cases. For ex-
ample, in Cariou v. Prince, the court expressly considered the "propriety" of the
defendant's conduct and "faulted artist Richard Prince for never seeking permission
to use the plaintiffs works or even attempting to contact him to ask 'about usage
rights to the Photos, even though [the plaintiffs work] clearly identified [the plain-
tiff] as the sole copyright holder' and the plaintiffs email address was readily avail-
able." 33
This is but one such example. Professor Fisher's analysis of fair use cases sheds
useful additional light on the broader role of propriety.34 He notes, for instance,
30 Colin Golvan, Copyright and Writers, 9 EUR. INT'L. PROP. REV. 66, 67 (1987) (discussing
Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Cal. 1935)).
3' Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[P]ropriety of
injunctive relief in cases arising under the Copyright Act must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
in accord with traditional equitable principles and without the aid of presumptions or a 'thumb
on the scale' in favor of issuing such relief.").
32 See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice ofLaw in Transnational
Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 40 (1999); Phanesh Koneru,
The Right "To Authorize" in U.S. Copyright Law: Questions of Contributory Infringement and
Extraterritoriality, 37 IDEA: J. L. & TECH 87, 92 (1996) (discussing the "propriety of the
extraterritorial application of copyright laws under appropriate facts.").
3 Simon J. Frankel & Matt Kellogg, Bad Faith and Fair Use, 60 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y.
U.S.A. 1, 28 (2012) (discussing Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). See also
Katherine C. Hall, Deconstructing a Robotic Toy: Unauthorized Circumvention and Trafficking in
Technology, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPuTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 411, 468 (2004) ("Copyright
owners and information users disagree about the propriety of the conduct that enables information
users to seize control over creative works in digital and analog form.").
34 Fisher, supra note 9, at 1678-82.
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that in "cases decided prior to 1976 courts occasionally referred either to the decency
of the defendant's behavior or to its consistency with customary practices."
35 Pro-
priety of conduct played a decisive role in several major post-1976 cases as well. To
take just one seminal case, in Harper r Row, Justice O'Connor wrote that "[a]lso
relevant to the 'character' of the [challenged] use is 'the propriety of the defendant's
conduct."' 36
Scholars have made several proposals designed to inject more "propriety" in
copyright law. Professor Yen, for example, has suggested using propriety to avoid
the "[b]ootstrap formalism [that] creates the danger of carelessly expanding copy-
right law to the detriment of the public interest." 37 Another commentator suggested
using propriety to avoid "hyperownership" of public domain works. 38 Professor
Lunney referred to the "propriety of copyright vel non" in articulating "a clear dis-
tinction in copyright between competitor or commercial copying and end-user cop-
ying." 39 In a different context, Professor Bell invoked the impropriety of allowing
"copyright porn trolls" to claim their rights.40 Last but not least, James Boyle used
propriety to oppose the use of copyright to silence critics of the Church of Scientol-
ogy.41 These uses of propriety are normative. They differ from the use of the term
propriety in improper appropriation cases. But as this Article argues below, this need
not necessarily be so.42 Although those general uses of propriety are often devoid of
clear definitional boundaries, the Article suggests that they illustrate the normative
potential that the notion, properly structured, can play.
3. Application in Improper Appropriation Cases
As the following pages explicate, there is a lack of uniformity across Circuits as
3 Id. at 1678.
36 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1985), citing
3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], at 13-72.
37 Alfred C. Yen, The Danger ofBootstrap Formalism in Copyright, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 453,
455 (1998).
38 Charles Cronin, Possession Is 99% of the Law: 3D Printing, Public Domain Cultural
Artifacts and Copyright, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 709, 729 (2016).
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 27 (2009).
40 Bell, supra note 7, at 810.
41 James Boyle, A Politics ofIntellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE
L.J. 87, 108 (1997).
42 Recourse to propriety in copyright is not limited to the Judicial Branch. Two examples
may be helpful. First, the CONTU report discussed the propriety of copyright protection in
computer programs. See National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU), Final Report on the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works, 3 J. MARSHALLJ. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 53, 53 (1981). See also Timothy
K. Armstrong, Symbols, Systems, and Software as Intellectual Property: Time for CONTU, Part II?,
24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 131, 143 (2018).
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to exactly which test should be used to determine the existence of an improper ap-
propriation in copyright infringement cases. Courts generally agree, however, that
the question is best stated as one of fact and thus defer to the fact-finder on the
propriety of the copying.43 A noticeable effect of considering propriety as a purely
factual matter is that it cannot be decided on summary judgment, thus crowding
court dockets on matters that more appropriately call for a legal-normative determi-
nation that could be addressed at the summary judgment stage.4 Moreover, most
courts have held that the use of objective evidence and expert testimony are not
admissible to assist in making this determination.45 Treating propriety as merely
factual, in this Article's view, gives short shrift to what could be a normatively por-
tentous test, as explained in Part II.
Impropriety, as a central element of the Second Circuit's Arnstein test, is om-
nipresent in copyright infringement cases, including cases in which the Supreme
Court denied certiorari petitions. 46 The Arnstein test calls for a two-part inquiry in
determining whether the defendant infringed the plaintiffs copyright. The first step
requires a determination of whether probative similarity with protected elements of
the plaintiffs work is present.47 The elements of the work that are protectable are
the "constituent elements of the work that are original" because infringement can
only happen in respect of protected works or parts of works.4 8 Many courts use
Judge Learned Hand's "abstraction test." 49 The "abstraction test" seeks to distill the
plaintiffs work down to its expression and to identify the "levels of abstraction" (or
distinct elements) that can be identified as expressions of the underlying idea.so
These elements may include specific aspects of character or plot development, for
example. A different way to complete this step is to use the "filtration approach," in
which unprotectable elements are systematically filtered out." Elements such as
4 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1946).
' Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins ofthe Copyright InfringementAnalysis,
68 STAN. L. REv. 791, 796 (2016).
4 Id. at 795-96.
46 See Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1159 (1986) (quoting Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980)); Comput. Assocs. Int'l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
544, 557-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affd in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
47 The expression was probably first coined by Professor Alan Latman. See generally Alan
Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright
Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1187 (1990).
4 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
'9 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1930).
o Id.
51 Comput. Assocs. Int'l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1992).
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scines a faire, ideas and elements in the public domain, are removed for lack of cop-
yright protection.5 2 The "filtration approach" is often paired with the "abstraction
test."53
After separating expression from unprotectable elements, the court must look
for evidence that the defendant actually copied from plaintiffs work.
54 The defend-
ant can only be found to have copied if she had access to the plaintiffs work, a step
that is functionally almost dispensed with if there is "a very high degree of similarity"
between the plaintiffs and the defendant's work. Analysis, dissection, and expert
testimony are admissible in the probative similarity inquiry.56 As this portion of the
inquiry rarely benefits from direct evidence of copying by the defendant, it tends to
rely on circumstances that justify an inference of copying.5 ' This type of evidence
might take the form of a defect (deliberate or not) in the plaintiffs work that the
defendant copied, such as a fake name on a map or a misplaced thumbnail on a
doll.5 1
The second step is an examination of the "substantial similarity" of the two
works. This step is conducted through the use of the lay (or ordinary) observer test.
The court in Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer described a lay observer test as an assess-
ment of whether a reasonable, ordinary person could ascertain the effect of the al-
legedly infringing work on the public "without any aid or suggestion or critical anal-
ysis by others." 59 As the Second Circuit later noted, "the ordinary observer, unless
he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them and regard
their aesthetic appeals as the same."60 As part of this second step, the trier of fact
must decide whether the appropriation was improper.61 Under the test as tradition-
ally applied, expert testimony may not be used, although a number of courts have
reconsidered this exclusion. 62 For example, expert testimony has proven to be useful
52 Id. at 710.
* See Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for Copyright
Infringement, 5 DEPAUL-LCAJ. ART & ENT. L. 43, 60-61 (1994).
5 Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998).
5 Access is deemed proven, absent evidence to the contrary, when the degree of similarity is
very high. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[D]
(rev. ed. 2018).
56 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
5 See Jeanette Rene Busek, Comment, Copyright Infringement: A Proposalfor a New Standard
for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of Possible Expressive Variation, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1777, 1785-86 (1998).
58 See Hassenfeld Bros. v. Mego Corp., No. 66 Civil 2202, 1966 WL 7646, at *786
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
5 Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (2d. Cir. 1933).
60 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
' Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
62 See Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
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to aid an "ordinary or lay observer" in understanding the complexities of software."3
Impropriety is rarely if ever invoked or defined directly. Instead, courts ask
whether actual copying takes place and whether the plaintiff and the defendant's
work were substantially similar (with the copied expression). These two elements
strike the Article as focusing essentially on the appropriation prong instead of the
propriety of the defendant's conduct. Put differently, in considering the application
of propriety to infringement cases, the improper appropriation prong of the Arnstein
test subsumed improper appropriation under the notion of actual copying, which
left virtually no room for propriety to play a normative role. 4
In contrast, in the Ninth Circuit, to determine "whether there is sufficient sim-
ilarity between the two works in question to conclude that the alleged infringer used
the copyrighted work in making his own," expert testimony and visual comparison
between the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work are frequently uti-
lized.65 After this "extrinsic" comparison, the Court turns to the overall, "intrinsic"
similarity between the two works.66 The purpose of this two-prong approach was
"to restrict the scope of a plaintiffs copyright from extending to (unprotectable)
ideas."67 The Ninth Circuit uses a "total concept and feel" test.6 8 It expressly targets
the subjective quality of the work as perceived by its "intended audience." 69 This
test is more encompassing than the abstraction test in that it considers character and
plot development, arrangement and choice of words, in addition to the general mes-
sage or theme sought to be conveyed by the work.70 Other relevant factors include
the "type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting
for the subject." 7 ' This test can be easily applied to a variety of works (literary work,
musical work, software, etc.).72 It is not obvious for a lay jury to put themselves in
the shoes of a theoretically defined "intended audience." 73
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. U.S.A. 719, 726-27 (2010).
6 Id. at 733 ("[S]oftware cases diverge significantly from the ordinary two-step analysis.
Virtually all the courts considering infringement of computer code have permitted expert
testimony. . . .").
6 See Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 289.
6 Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975).
' See YBarbo, supra note 1, at 293.
67 Id. at 302.
' See Busek, supra note 57, at 1790.
69 Id
70 Id.
71 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977).
72 See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1986).
7 See Jamie Lund, Fixing Music Copyright, 79 BROOK. L. REv. 61, 74 (2013) ("[T]his act of
substituting the jury's judgment for that of a work's intended audience can be problematic when
the jury does not properly represent the constituencies that make up the particular work's intended
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The Second and Ninth Circuits differ substantially. To summarize, the Second
Circuit test proceeds as follows: (1) proof of ownership of a valid copyright; (2)
actual copying by the defendant, which includes access and probative similarity
(both of which can be combined if there is a high degree of similarity); and (3)
improper appropriation. By contrast, the "Ninth Circuit, albeit with some modifi-
cation, adopted the Arnstein test and interpreted it to require the application of (1)
an 'extrinsic' test aimed at determining whether there exists a substantial similarity
in underlying ideas; and (2) an 'intrinsic' test to ascertain whether there exists a
substantial similarity in the expression of the underlying idea." 74 The first step, un-
der the Ninth Circuit's Kroffl test, "is focused on a dissective analysis of similarities
and differences in expression in the works at issue."75
For our purposes, probably the most significant difference is that the Second
Circuit test separates the copying determination (with possible input from experts)
and the improper appropriation determination (usually without expert evidence). 76
Using the lay observer test at that stage means that uncopyrightable elements of the
plaintiffs work may be considered by the fact-finder, if only because they may be
difficult to exclude in a side-by-side comparison.7 7 A jury might also be tempted to
follow an impulse that copying that appears as free-riding should be illegal, even
though free-riding is not per se illegal.7 Jury instructions are tricky in this area.
79
Put differently, it is not an easy task for a jury comparing two works side-by-side.
While similarity between two works may be because both use similar ideas, scines h
faire and other unprotectable elements, it is difficult to resist anti-free-riding intui-
tions.80 To quote Professor Samuelson, the risk is "that the trier of fact may conclude
audience."). See also Christopher Jon Sprigman & Samantha Fink Hedrick, Copyright's Filtration
Problem, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 571 (2019).
74 Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
7 Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 107 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1821, 1830 (2013).
76 See YBarbo, supra note 1, at 296.
n Id.
71 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., judging Similarity, 100 IOWAL. REV. 267, 288 (2014)
("[T]he law could embrace the reality that moral intuitions relating to labor and free-riding
directly influence the assessment of similarity, which in turn serves as a simple proxy for
wrongfulness.").
7 See Zahr K. Said, A Transactional Theory of the Reader in Copyright Law, 102 IOWA L.
REV. 605, 639 (2017) ("Jury instructions in copyright cases often fail in terms of being
comprehensible to jurors, being feasible for jurors, and being fully accurate with respect to
copyright law.").
o This may be analogized to the determination of non-obviousness in patent infringement
cases. Because after seeing the invention it is likely to seem obvious, courts have devised devices
to avoid cognitive biases. See Emer Simic, The TSM Test Is Dead! Long Live the TSM Test! The
Aftermath ofKSR, What Was All the Fuss About?, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 227, 231 (2009) ("The Supreme
[Vol. 23:2610
IMPROPER APPROPRIATION
that second-step copying has occurred as a spillover from a finding of first-step cop-
ying," because unprotected elements are relevant to the first part of the inquiry but
not the second.' A test such as "total concept and feel" in Ninth Circuit jurispru-
dence arguably calls for a holistic yet potentially imprudent test that risks blending
into the analysis unprotectable elements, and is therefore unlikely to ameliorate out-
comes. 82
Ostensibly, both the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit are concerned about
overprotection. 83 In Castle Rock, for example, the Second Circuit underscored the
requirement that copying be "qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient" to be ac-
tionable. 84 If overprotection concerns are to be truly a part of the equation, then
finding ways to filter unprotectable elements correctly and address free-riding fuzz-
iness in "factual" determinations of copying is essential.
Interestingly, some courts have abandoned, or at least transformed, the bifur-
cated test of substantial similarity in cases involving computer programs, using in-
stead an integrated substantial similarity test under which both lay and expert testi-
mony are admissible.8 5
Many scholars have argued that a hybrid of the tests by the Second and Ninth
Circuits, possibly based on the application of the idea-expression distinction, should
be developed. 86 Others have opted for one over the other. Professor Nimmer, for
instance, has argued that the "total concept" test was "ill-advised in the extreme."8
The Article suggests a revised test in Part II.
II. A GREATER ROLE FOR PROPRIETY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Propriety Is Not "Purely Factual"
This Article suggests that propriety should inform copyright infringement anal-
Court's objective [Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)] factors are
instructive not only because they provide judges with a way to analyze technical issues, but also
because they attempt to guard against the inevitable problem of hindsight bias in obviousness
determinations."). Such formal analytical devices are almost non-existent in copyright law.
81 Samuelson, supra note 75, at 1826.
82 See id. at 1830-32 (explaining the risks of using a total concept and feel test).
83 See Claudia Hong, Comment, New Yorkers Have Got It Right: A Call for a Uniform
Standard to Copyright Infingement Analysis, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 33, 49 (2006).
84 Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132,138 (2d Cir.1998).
85 See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233-35 (3d Cit. 1986);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
' See Broaddus, supra note 53, at 44; Hong, supra note 83, at 34. See also Balganesh, supra
note 44, at 859.
87 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1][c]
(rev. ed. 2018).
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yses. This proposal uses the Arnstein test but actually reflects the words used to de-
scribe the test. Recognizing the normative role of impropriety might make propriety
of copying a mixed question of fact and law which, as the Ninth Circuit said in
Smith v. Commissioner, requires "the consideration of legal concepts and . . . the
exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal principles."" Exactly.89
The task of defining a propriety-based standard can be approached in a variety
of ways, for example, by considering the actions or intent of the agent or by focusing
instead on the consequences of the action. Adam Smith's guidance is a useful start-
ing point. Smith carefully explicated how propriety is not a synonym of virtue, but
rather one of its components. 90 Copyright law does not require that defendants in a
copyright case be virtuous. Instead, we should ask, if we are to apply a normative
propriety-based test, whether the defendant's behavior was proper. Simply put,
some appropriations are proper and thus permissible; others are not. In the latter
case, a defendant may then invoke fair use or another exception or defense.
Professor Balganesh proposed changing the improper appropriation test to
"cognizable similarity," which would "operate as a mixed question of law and
fact." 9 1 Interestingly, Professor Balganesh suggested that judges should:
[D]ecide the issue by reference to copyright's underlying goals and purposes,
by asking whether the type/form of copying is likely to affect the market for
the work, or indeed whether it involved freeriding on the creator's authorial
contribution to the work, rendering it questionable as a moral matter. Having
grappled with this question, the judge would then apply the criteria to the
specific work. 92
This Article agrees with the underlying suggestion, namely that by referring to
the purpose and goal of copyright, the analysis is likely to yield more normatively
balanced results. Indeed, Professor Balganesh's masterful dissection of Judge Jerome
Frank's opinion in Arnstein shows how it sent improper appropriation to normative
oubliettes by entrusting it exclusively to fact-finders.93 The Article certainly agrees
with suggestions, such as Professor Balganesh's, that the Arnstein test can be amelio-
rated.94
Having demonstrated the perils of the Arnstein test, at least two quite different
8 Smith v. Comm'r, 300 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002).
' As noted below, this change would allow cases to be decided on summary judgment. See
infra note 2 and accompanying text. The article's proposal could also be used to present juries
with more normative instructions concerning the permissibility of the defendant's conduct. This
would not be unprecedented. See supra note 29 and infra note 102 and accompanying text.
" See SMITH, supra note 13, at 23.
9' Balganesh, supra note 44, at 859.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 855.
9 See id.; Samuelson, supra note 75, at 1843-44.
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remedial approaches are possible. The first is simply to abandon the test. The second
is to reinvigorate it. This Article takes the view that the test should be retained but
that propriety-construed according to its usual meaning and defined based on ap-
plicable customs, practices, and ethical norms-should actually be considered an
integral part of the test.
As an example of how this might work, one commentator suggested distin-
guishing cases where the plaintiffs work contains a narrow range of protectable el-
ements from those where the work contains a wide range.95 In the former case, vir-
tual identity would be required to constitute improper appropriation.96 Arguably
this is the approach used by the Ninth Circuit in the Skyy Spirits case, as there was
a very narrow range of protectable expression in the photograph of the blue bottle. 97
Indeed, there is a whole line of cases supporting the proposition that virtual identity
is required when copyright protection is thin, meaning that the scope of potentially
infringing conduct is narrower or, on the flip side of the doctrinal coin, appropria-
tion is more likely to be proper and thus permissible.9 8
B. TeleologicalArguments in Support of the Application of (Im)propriety
There is a legal-philosophical disconnect in the Arnstein test. (Im)propriety is
treated as a matter of fact devoid of normative content in current copyright infringe-
ment jurisprudence.9 9 Yet, semantically at least, propriety demands a normative ap-
proach. This Article thus wholeheartedly agrees with Professor Balganesh's assess-
ment that "improper appropriation is indelibly a normative judgment."" Rather
than splitting cases according to a yardstick such as the amount of protectable ex-
pression or range of options available to the defendant, this Article argues that the
Arnstein test should be forged anew by a normative blacksmith-rather than a purely
" Hong, supra note 83, at 53-56.
96 Id.
9 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that similarity
between different marketing photographs of Skyy vodka bottles was inevitable due to shared
concept, and that subtle differences in lighting, angles, shadows, etc., defeated photographer's
infringement claims).
98 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913-14 (9th Cit. 2010) ("If there's a
wide range of expression . . . then copyright protection is 'broad' and a work will infringe if it's
'substantially similar' to the copyrighted work. If there's only a narrow range of expression ... ,
then copyright protection is 'thin' and a work must be 'virtually identical' to infringe.") (citation
omitted); TransWestern Publ'g Co. LP v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., 133 F.3d. 773, 776 (10th
Cir. 1998) ("[Mlore similarity is required when less protect[a]ble matter is at issue. Thus, if
substantial similarity is the normal measure required to demonstrate infringement,
'supersubstantial' similarity must pertain when dealing with 'thin' works.") (quoting 4 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER &DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 [A] [4] (rev. ed. 2018)).
9 See Lemley, supra note 62.
" Balganesh, supra note 44, at 807.
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factual carpenter-so that it can play a stronger role in infringement analyses.
0 1
What we need to debate is not whether propriety is part of the test (it is: Arn-
stein is good law until courts jettison it), but rather the work that the notion of
propriety should perform in the test. In a nutshell, the suggestion-which seems far
from outrageous-is that, if a defendant's appropriation must be improper to consti-
tute infringement, its opposite, propriety, should be an integral part of the infringe-
ment analysis.
Propriety, defined according to custom and practice, and applicable ethical
norms, can function, to that extent, as the notion of "public" in the public perfor-
mance right. Asking whether a performance is public is distinct from deciding
whether a performance took place.1 02 Interestingly, the publicness of the perfor-
mance is a mixed question of fact and law-which can, therefore, be decided on
summary judgment.1 03 Similarly, asking whether copying took place is a different
inquiry than asking whether the appropriation was improper. It could be dealt with
in the same way as a determination of publicness. Impropriety strikes this Article as
at least as defensible as a mixed question of fact and law as publicness.
This Article suggests judging the propriety or impropriety of a defendant's ap-
propriation teleologically. The question to ask is not so much the purpose of the
defendant's use, but rather whether the appropriation fits the purpose of copyright
law to encourage new expression-which, in constitutional terms, arguably pro-
motes the Progress of Science and Useful Arts.' Consider for instance a case against
Jeff Koons in which the plaintiff argued that a collage created by Mr. Koons using
preexisting photographs he found in fashion magazines and advertisements was cop-
yright infringement. 0 5 The Second Circuit noted that "copyright law's goal of 'pro-
moting the Progress of Science and useful Arts' would be better served by allowing
Koons's use of 'Silk Sandals' than by preventing it."10 6
101 This would best be done if it was considered a mixed question of fact and law, although
fact-finders can make factual-normative determinations. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
102 Only public performances, as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101, are subject to the exclusive
right contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). The test for infringement was expressed as follows infobete
Music Co., Inc. v. Johnson Commc'ns, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 (S.D. Ohio 2003): "[tlo
establish a claim for copyright infringement . . . by means of public performance, a claimant must
prove: (1) the originality and authorship of a composition; (2) a valid copyright under the
formalities of the [19761 Copyright Act; (3) claimant's ownership of the copyright at issue; (4)
defendant's public performance of the composition; and (5) defendant's failure to obtain permission
from the claimant for such performance." (emphasis added). For a discussion, see Adam Barrett
Townshend, Crashing by Design: Toward a Uniform Standard for Public Place Analysis Under
Federal Copyright Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2045, 2053 (2004).
103 See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 60 (3d Cir. 1986).
104 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
"0I Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246-47 (2d Cir. 2006).
1o6 Id. at 259 (citation omitted). The other case was Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cit.
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In Feist, the Supreme Court found that encouraging original expression (con-
taining a modicum of creativity resulting from an author's creative choices) was nec-
essary to benefit from copyright protection.o7 In Sony, the Supreme Court de-
scribed copyright's purpose as follows:
The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring
the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of the authors. It is said that reward to the author or artist
serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius. 0
A renewed emphasis on propriety would turn the analytical spotlight on the
defendant's conduct and measure such conduct by the yardstick of the constitu-
tional direction. In other words, propriety demands normativity, and the propriety
(and thus permissibility) of an appropriation should be gauged against the purpose
of copyright law, and the alignment, or lack thereof, between that purpose and the
defendant's use. This Article agrees, therefore, with Professor Balganesh's suggestion
that "as a principled normative matter-driven by copyright's utilitarian and con-
stitutional goals-there may be little reason to treat all aspects of the infringement
analysis as purely factual questions for a lay jury. "109
Professor Fishman has argued that propriety could also play a role as a vehicle
by which courts consider the process by which a defendant has copied, rather than
deciding only on end-product comparison. 10 Some courts have considered, for ex-
ample, the effort made by the defendant."'
Suggesting that propriety should play a more significant role is not a proposi-
tion entirely devoid of precedential support. As courts have stated, including the
Supreme Court in Harper & Row, propriety can play a decisive role in copyright
doctrine. 12 In cases other than those applying some version of the Arnstein test,
such as those dealing with fair use, the notion of propriety is normative. In the in-
fringement test, in contrast, normativity seems to have evaporated, though maybe
not entirely. There are traces of the emergence of a normative, propriety-based ap-
proach in Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., a case in which the Third
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992).
107 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). For a discussion,
see generally Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Anatomy ofa Congressional Power, 43 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
"o' Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948)).
109 Balganesh, supra note 44, at 800.
"o See Joseph P. Fishman, The Copy Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 855, 873 (2016) ("Judges,
too, sometimes subtly invoke the defendant's process when ostensibly assessing the propriety of
the defendant's product, despite process's black-letter irrelevance.").
"I Id. at 877-78.
112 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
2019] 615
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
Circuit considered that among the several factors that should be considered when
determining if an improper appropriation occurred were "creativity and independ-
ent effort" by the defendant. 113
However, this is not essential to this Article's suggestion that judging the pro-
priety of defendants' conduct in light of applicable practices, custom, and ethical
norms could be seen as " [m] ixed questions of law and fact that require the consid-
eration of legal concepts and involve the exercise of judgment about the values un-
derlying legal principles."l 4 Such a change would imply that determinations could
be made at the summary judgment stage, although the fact-finder could also be
required to factor in applicable norms and customs.1 1 5 It would also imply possible
de novo review on appeal, which could lead to much clearer lines being drawn by
the caselaw to delineate areas of permissible conduct.
C. Normative Strands ofa New Test
The Second and Ninth Circuits agree on several features of the copyright in-
fringement test. Both Circuits should pay heed to the Supreme Court's direction
that unprotectable elements must be filtered out in some way, and both Circuits
aim to do so.'" They also agree that the defendant must have had access to the
plaintiffs work, although in some cases evidence of access will be entirely circum-
stantial, such as presuming access in cases of striking similarity (which should always
be subject to counter-evidence, especially in cases where the work contains few cre-
ative choices and where similarity could reasonably derive from a limited universe
of possible choices).' 17 As noted in Part I, however, the tests differ in their analysis
of substantial similarity and the role that the propriety of the defendant's conduct
should play.
When considering propriety in the infringement analysis, there is a distinction
between a commercially consumptive use, on the one hand, and a bona fide creative
reuse, on the other hand. It is well established that commerciality is not a bar to a
finding of transformative fair use, but it weighs heavily against a finding of fair use
in a case involving a consumptive use.'"s An unauthorized consumptive use by a
defendant can be considered prima facie improper.119
" Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975)).
114 Mayors v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 785 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1986). See also
Smith v. Comm'r, 300 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002).
"' See Universal Atheletic Sales Co., 511 F.2d at 907; supra note 29 and accompanying text.
116 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
117 See supra note 55.
11. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 2006).
"9 Professor Fishman's intuition that a link between trade secret law and copyright law can
produce productive outcomes seems warranted (see Fishman, supra note 110, at 856). For
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In Blanch v. Koons, the Second Circuit found that Jeff Koons' use of preexisting
fashion photographs was a fair use.'2 0 In doing so, it clearly separated significantly
transformative reuse from the mere "untransformed duplication," such as a photo-
copy.121 This seems fully consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Campbell,
in which it wrote that when "the second use is transformative, market substitution
is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred." 22 This
notion is arguably present in cases dealing with appropriation art but works as a
subterranean, normative element.1 23 It clearly infuses findings of fair use in appro-
priation art cases. 124 This Article suggests bringing it fully into the sunlight of the
infringement analysis.1 25
Commercially consumptive use of a work (that is, copying for consumption
with commercial intent) should normally infringe as improper appropriation-sub-
ject to a possible fair use defense. Bona fide creative uses, on the other hand, prima
facie fulfill the constitutional direction. Creative reuses may well be 'proper. "In other
words, every author can, and many authors do, reuse preexisting material. A quote
should not have to rely on fair use, nor should we try to pretend it somehow does
not matter by labeling it de minimis. A quotation is not always de minimis, yet a
quotation is usually proper.126 Indeed the quotation right is the only exception for-
mulated in mandatory terms in the Berne Convention-which, as of this writing,
applies to 176 countries, including the United States.1 27 Simply put, quotation is
example, in determining whether a misappropriation of a trade secret took place, courts often look
at the propriety of the conduct. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(a)-(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
The interplay between copyright law and trade secret law was discussed, e.g., in Comput. Assocs.
Int'l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affdinpart, vacatedin part, 982
F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
120 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 246.
121 Id. at 254. This is what distinguishes Blanch from Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
122 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
123 Many thanks to Zahr Said for suggesting this term.
124 See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253.
125 This aligns with Joe Fishman's suggestion to make the copy process an explicit element
of the infringement analysis. Fishman, supra note 110, at 861 ("Copyright doctrine could be both
more descriptively transparent and more normatively attractive by expressly looking beyond the
face of a copy and asking how it got there.").
126 De minimis is a quantitative test essentially; while propriety is a broader analysis that can
take into account quantity, quality, and purpose.
127 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 10 ("It shall be permissible to make quotations
from a work which has already been lawfully made available to the public. . . .") (emphasis added).
The United States joined the Convention with effect from March 1, 1989. See Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. Res. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 40 (1988).
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not (just) fair use; it is not (just) transformative; it is proper.128
This might explain why Victor Hugo, perhaps best known as the author of Les
Misdrables but also a father of Continental authors' rights and of the Berne Conven-
tion, wrote that the right of writers must yield to that of "human spirit."
1 29 The
term spirit (esprit in French) is quite common in French copyright (authors' rights)
law, as a work of authorship is referred to in that system as une euvre ae l'esprit (a
work of the spirit).1 30 It is thus incongruous to treat quotation and other forms of
creative reuse as prima facie infringement (and thus dependent on the fair use de-
fense), for a premise of that conclusion is that copyright prima facie should interfere
with a creative process it is meant to support. Bona fide creative reuse (by quotation or
otherwise) illustrates a case where the normativity implied by the notion of propriety
might be called upon to play a role and offers a window to the potential of a nor-
mative infringement test based on propriety.
As noted above, propriety can be measured according to custom, practices, and
ethics. 3 ' A court not only could but, in this Article's suggestion, should use propri-
ety as a doctrinal vehicle to consider how custom, practice, or ethics might render a
use proper. Ethics may be relevant if the parties to the case are members of the same
epistemic community and that community has recognized ethical standards. Cus-
tom and practice may be shown to exist in the defendant's field of endeavor by
allowing expert evidence. 132 Therefore, the Article proposes that appropriation (cop-
ying) be assessed as a mixed question of law and fact with a normative consideration
of its (im)propriety based on customs, practices, and applicable ethical rules-
which, as noted above, in this context may be derived from "popular morality."
33
128 A United States government response submitted to the World Trade Organization
described quotation as the "classic" example of fair use. See Council for TRIPS, Review of
Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights-Replies to Questions Posed to the United States
by Brazil, the European Communities and Their Member States, Australia and Korea, Oct. 30,
1996, WTO Doc. IP/Q/USA/1, at 4. For more on the role of transformativeness, see, e.g., R.
Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467,
468 (2008) (noting that the "'transformative' nature of the defendant's use has thus become a
major part of fair use analysis . . . .").
129 See DANIEL J. GERVAIS, (RE)STRUCTURING COPYRIGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE PATH TO
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT REFORM, REV'D ED. 34 (2019).
13o See, e.g., Les Grands Principes du Droit dAuteur, BIBLIOTHEQUE NATIONALE DE FRANCE,
http://www.bnf.fr/fr/professionnels/principes droitauteur.html.
131 See supra Part I.
132 See Evidence-Expert Testimony-Sixth Circuit Holds That Expert Testimony Is Not
Needed to Establish A Standard of Care in Surrogacy Cases.-Stiver v. Parker, 975 F2d 261 (6th
Cir. 1992), 106 HARv. L. REv. 951, 954 (1993) ("[C]ourts usually establish the appropriate
standard of care through expert evidence about the custom and practice applicable to the
professional conduct in question.").
133 See Fisher, supra note 9, at 1681.
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IMPROPER APPROPRIATION
The next section uses appropriation art to illustrate how the suggested reinvig-
oration of propriety in copyright infringement cases might be applied.
D. Application
Recent empirical research suggests that authors are not (in the aggregate) par-
ticularly good at maximizing welfare and efficiency and that the ability to reuse
(whether because it is licensed, fair use, etc.) pre-existing content is not very closely
tied to copyright constraints but rather to a host of other factors. 3 4 The normative
implications are relatively clear: should one stop generations of younger creators
who were "born digital" and see no good reason not to use digital tools to create,
even if it includes some measure of appropriation? When does that appropriation
cross the propriety line?1 35 The line has probably been crossed when there is suffi-
cient proximity between the works, especially where much of the primary work's
creative choices have been appropriated and little has been added. This analysis
should be informed by the fact that copyright has always tried to avoid judgment
on the quality or artistic merit of new forms of creation, and the fact that the ap-
propriation of the past is a necessary ingredient of an intergenerational dialogue,
which might take several new and possibly irreverent forms.1 36 At the very least,
judges should be aware of any underlying bias.1 37 Originality is what is added by the
artists, both as a contribution to the work's inherent structure (what one might call
aesthetic originality), but often also, especially for new art forms, as a posture of the
artist vis-h-vis her creative milieu. 138 Moreover, copyright is precisely meant to create
incentives to produce original works.' 3 9 If we mean it when we say that we want to
foster the emergence of new expression, proper appropriation should be encouraged,
and not seen as prima facie infringement subject to a case-by-case fair use determi-
nation. 140
3 See Stefan Bechtold et al., Innovation Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential Creativity in
Intellectual Property, 91 IND. L.J. 1251, 1253 (2016).
135 On that distinction, see Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC- Making Copyright
Sense of User-Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 850-55 (2009).
' The exclusion of artistic merit in copyright policy is well established at least theoretically
in most legal systems. In the United States, Justice Holmes's made the point famously in Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). Courts however often fail to properly
exclude artistic merit from consideration. See Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of
Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66
INDIANA L. J. 175, 231 (1990).
137 See Christine Haight Farley, JudgingArt, 79 TuL. L. REv. 805, 845-46 (2005).
138 Catherine Kintzler, La Copie et l'Original, DIMlTER 1, 8 (Dec. 2003),
demeter. revue. univ-lille3.fr/copie/kintzler.pdf
139 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Iragine That?, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 30 (2011).
140 See Kintzler, supra note 138, at 8. In some cases, transgression might, in an ironic twist,
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CONCLUSION
The Article reviewed the notion of propriety, which forms an integral part of
the main copyright infringement test derived from the Second Circuit 19 4 6 's opin-
ion in Arnstein v. Porter. The notion of propriety has been stripped of any obvious
moral and normative meaning. Yet propriety plays a significant role in other areas
of copyright law and indeed, in many other areas of law. This Article argues that
propriety should be reinvigorated as a normative notion focused on the defendant's
conduct, measured with appropriate custom and practice, and ethical norms, as
yardsticks.
become the norm.
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